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COMMENT/Summary and Successive Suspension of
Trading under the Exchange Act of 1934:
The Constitution, the Congress and the SEC*
Introduction
If in its opinion the public interest and the protection of investors
so require, the [Securities and Exchange] Commission is authorized
summarily to suspend trading, otherwise than on a national securi-
ties exchange, in any security . . . for a period not exceeding ten
days .... I
And if in its opinion the public interest so requires, summarily to
suspend trading in any registered security on any national securities
exchange for a period not exceeding ten days .... 2
Section 19(a) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 embodies the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's power to summarily suspend trading in se-
curities. The power at first was limited to securities listed on stock exchanges.
Thirty years later, however, over-the-counter issues were brought within the
aegis of statutory summary suspension power, though the new authority was
embodied in Section 15 of the Act.
Experiencing little controversy in its enactment, Section 19(a) (4) initially
laid dormant for ten years, waiting for criteria to be developed which would
define "emergency," the type of situation deemed a pre-requisite for exer-
cising the power. It was not until November 29, 1944, that the Commis-
sion issued its first summary suspension order.3 For the next twenty years the
newly found power was used sparingly; in only twenty-eight subsequent
cases did the Commission find an "emergency." Since 1964, however, there
has been a rapid proliferation in the SEC's issuance of suspensions. During
this four year period, the number of suspensions has nearly quadrupled the
* Based on a study made by Robert J. Gillispie, Editor-in-Chief, Vol. XVII, and
Charles M. Tobin, Comment Editor, Volume XVII.
1. Securities Exchange Act § 15(c) (5), 78 Stat. 574 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78o (c)
(5) (1964).
2. Securities Exchange Act § 19(a) (4), 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (a)
(4) (1964).
3. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 3626, 3629, 3632, 3635
(1944) (1 month). The SEC learned that the president of Elastic Stop Nut had com-
mitted suicide. Additionally and more importantly, grave questions were raised as to the
accuracy and adequacy of the financial statements in the company's recent filings.
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number issued in the preceding thirty years. Since the beginning of this
year alone, there have been twenty-seven such orders.
Despite this sudden increase in suspensions, little has been written and
nothing litigated on Section 19(a) (4) and its over-the-counterpart, Section
15(c) (5). The purpose of this Comment is to analyze this power and its use
by the Commission, focusing particularly on several significant questions:
What are the criteria for the power's application? What are its limitations,
especially in the area of successive application? What remedies, if any, are
available in the event of its abuse? What part, if any, did the 1964 amend-
ment play in the increased utilization of Section 19(a) (4), and further, what
part should it play?
The discussion of these issues will first examine the intent of the enacting
Congress, then view the SEC's interpretation of the statute as seen through its
exercise of the power, and finally survey the area of possible remedies for
abuse.
Legislative History and Successive Suspension
No instance of serious legal objection to the Commission's summary powers
is found in the legislative history of Section 19(a) (4). A possible explanation
is that Congress carefully limited this power "to a period not exceeding ten
days," and then only when the "public interest so requires." This limitation
was said to comply with "[t]he requirement expressed in the cases [where dele-
gation of congressional commerce powers has been challenged] ... that there
must be standards prescribed by Congress for the guidance of the adminis-
trative agency."
'4
On the other hand, there has been serious objection to the interpretation
given this power by the Securities and Exchange Commission-an interpreta-
tion perhaps supported by later congressional committee reports. The case
analysis will demonstrate that the SEC has considered itself authorized to
renew any suspension every ten days, and, if it views the public interest as
still requiring, to renew it for unlimited successive periods-reaching in one
case two and one-half5 and in another five years. 6 The process by which this
is accomplished is, of course, entirely non-adversary, for as the name suggests,
it is a summary proceeding.
The Commission's successive exercise of the power must be considered in
the context of limitations the enacting Congress intended to placed upon it.
4. Hearings on H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 935 (1934).
5. Bon Ami Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 5882, 5890, 6144, 6677 (1959).
6. Continental Vending Mach. Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 7034 (1963) (still
suspended on Aug. 20, 1968).
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Furthermore, the legislative history of Section 15(c) (5) must be examined.
Consideration of this 1964 amendment is important not only because it is a
potentially persuasive source of support for the Commission's successive ap-
plication of Section 19(a) (4), but also because it may well be the cause be-
hind the Commission's stepped-up exercise of summary suspension power.
In 1933, Secretary of Commerce Daniel Roper, at President Roosevelt's
direction, established a committee 7 to study the problems which federal regu-
lation of stock exchanges might present. The committee deemed it imperative
that a "Government agency operating in this field.., be in the highest degree
effective, non-political [and] able to act rapidly .... ,,8 But the committee
also recommended that an "[a]ppropriate procedure for appealing to the
courts from the orders of the Stock Exchange Authority must, of course, be
devised."9 As a result of the committee's report, investigations were initiated
by the Senate in the Seventy-second Congress; in the Seventy-third Congress
the Senate investigations were resumed, while the House of Representatives
commenced its own inquiry. In both Houses of Congress, a series of bills were
introduced which evolved into the Fletcher-Rayburn Act, or as it is officially
and commonly known, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10
Although changes were made in other sections of the Act during the course
of this evolution, the provision authorizing the ten-day suspension power was
untouched from the first time it appeared in the House committee print on
April 3, 1934. This was followed by inclusion in the Senate print on April 4.
Curiously, there was no reference to summary suspensions in the public hear-
ings preceding this inclusion. The specific source and inducement, therefore,
are unknown, and nothing conclusive on the question of intent can be drawn
from the legislative records of the enactment period.
Section 19(a) (2) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Commission to sus-
pend the registration of a security "[a]fter appropriate notice and opportunity
for hearing . . . if the Commission finds that the issuer of such security has
failed to comply with any provision of this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder."' 1 Both the House' 2 and Senate13 committee reports distinguish
the Section 19 (a) (2) adversary suspension authority from the Section 19 (a) (4)
summary suspension power on the basis of an "emergency." While "emer-
7. The committee was composed of Chairman John Dickinson, A. A. Berle, Arthur
H. Dean, J. M. Landis and Henry J. Richardson.
8. COMM. ON STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 7 (1934).
9. Id. at 12.
10. 48 Stat. 881-905, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-781, 78m-78o, 78o-3 to 78hh (1964).
11. Id. at 898, 15 U.S.C. § 78s (a) (2) (1964).
12. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1934).
13. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
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gency" was undefined, it has been the SEC's position, as will be seen from a
study of the cases, that an emergency exists when a prospective investor
does not have adequate or reliable information to make a fair judgment of a
particular security. This characterization, however, appears subject to at least
one infirmity; that is, the very purpose of the Exchange Act was to insure
adequate information for investors. Conceivably, following the SEC's reason-
ing, any deviation from the Act's express provisions could be deemed an emer-
gency. But alternative means of meeting certain departures from the Act are
found in other sections, 14 and the committee reports' characterization of
only summary suspension as an emergency power is persuasive authority
that not every deviation is to be construed as an emergency.
In that connection, it is noteworthy that Mr. Thomas Corcoran, testifying
before the Senate committee on its original version of Section 19(a) (2),
stated: "Of course, this is the extreme remedy if everything else fails."15
Senator Gore responded: "Yes; capital punishment is the extreme limit; that
is true." 16 This exchange took place only three days before the summary
power of Section 19(a) (4) first appeared in the House bill, while Mr. Cor-
coran was serving as an advisor to the House committee. Yet the "capital
punishment" referred to is limited to a twelve month suspension, after an
adversary proceeding before the Commission, the results of which, in some
aspects, are appealable to the courts under Section 25 of the Act. 17 In con-
trast lies the boundless-theoretically and effectually-limits of the Commis-
sion's interpretation of Section 19(a) (4) as a nonadversary, renewable, and
arguably nonappealable suspension.
The Senate committee report, however, does not indicate that the majority
of the members regarded anything in Section 19 as such an extreme measure.
The report states:
Disciplinary action short of criminal or civil penalties is provided
for in Section 19. The Commission is authorized in case of certain
violations and after adequate hearing, to suspend or withdraw the
registration of an exchange or of a security . . . . In an emergency
the Commission may suspend trading in a security for 10 days, or,
14. See, e.g., Section 21 of the Securities Exchange Act, which gives the Commission
broad powers to conduct investigations, seek injunctions, and prosecute offenses for
violations of the Act. 48 Stat. 899-901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1964).
15. Hearings on S. Res. 56, 84 and 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., at 6573 (1934).
16. Id. at 6574.
17. 48 Stat. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8y (1964): "Any person aggrieved by an order
issued by the Commission in a proceeding under this title to which such person is a
party may obtain a review of such order in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United
States ...." (Emphasis added.)
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with the consent of the President of the United States, close an ex-
change for 90 days. 18 (Emphasis added.)
The House report treated the scope and constitutionality of H.R. 9323, the
bill eventually enacted as the Exchange Act, as follows:
[T]he wide delegation of powers to the... Commission .. .has been
considered with particular care-and the delegation made only with
the indication of such maximum standards for discretion as ... the
technical character of the problems to be dealt with would permit.
The bill legislates specifically just as far as the Committee feels it
can. 19 (Emphasis added.)
With specific reference to Section 19, the House report noted that although
orders issued under Section 19(a) (1), (2), and (3) must be preceded by notice
and an opportunity for hearing, "action [taken] under (4) is of an emergency
nature and therefore limited in time." 20 To permit a more thorough evalua-
tion, the minority report21 accompanying this bill urged a postponement of
floor action until the next Congress convened; one area evoking serious con-
cern was the variety and importance of suspension powers.
22
Commissioner Landis of the SEC testified on both H.R. 7852 and H.R.
8720, predecessors of the bill ultimately enacted. With respect to the former,
which contained no summary suspension provision, he observed:
Some weeks ago, Secretary Roper gave to the President ... a re-
port of a departmental committee, of which I happened to be a
member, which said that the objective of stock exchange regulation
should be a minimum of specific statutory requirements and a maxi-
18. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934). A number of witnesses objected
to this kind of broad sweep with regard to suspension power at hearings conducted on
H.R. 7852, a forerunner of H.R. 9323. Mr. Eugene E. Thompson, president of the
Associated Stock Exchanges, stated:
The language of this section would seem to have no precedent in the an-
nals of Congress. It provides, among other things, that whenever the commis-
sion shall be of the opinion that any person "is about to violate any provision
of the act" and when any person is "about to engage in any acts or prac-
tices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the provisions of this
act, or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof", the com-
mission may proceed against such person . .. for having an intention which
may be nothing more than suspicion or an inference. We see no reason for the
delegation of such powers, and we strongly protest such language as is con-
tained in this section.
Hearings on H. R. 7852 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 263 (1934).
20. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1934).
21. H.R. REP. No. 1383, Part 2 (Minority Report to Accompany H.R. 9323), 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
22. Id. at 2.
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mum of administrative discretion. I think that criterion is a proper
one.
The bill, in my judgment, largely follows that requirement.23
Slightly more than one month later, Congressman Wolverton asked Com-
missioner Landis if there were any provisions in H.R. 8720 which would allow
removal of stocks from the exchanges when manipulative practices were
taking place. The Commissioner replied:
As I remember it, this section that has been called to my attention
limits the right to taking off, to delisting the securities, to cases where
the issuer of those securities has failed to comply with any provisions
of this act or rules or regulations thereunder.
Now there you should have to relate the manipulative practices to
the issuers in order to authorize delisting on that ground.
On the other hand, in subsection 4 there is a right of suspension
when the public interest so requires, to suspend trading in any regis-
tered security for a period of not exceeding 10 days in order to act
quickly under those circumstances.24 (Emphasis added.)
Although the SEC presently interprets Section 19(a) (4) as a delegation of
authority to issue successive ten-day suspensions, it has not always taken such
a strong position. In 1955, the Commission, in a letter to Senator William
Fulbright, suggested an amendment specifically authorizing suspensions for
more than a single ten-day period. The Commission noted that an emergency
may last more than ten days, and "[i]t might be helpful if the Commission's
power to review the ten-day suspension from time to time were clarified."
25
Accordingly, S. 3915 and H.R. 11129 were introduced in 1956, allowing
suspensions "for one or more periods no one of which shall exceed ten
days .... "26
The request was renewed in 1958, and bills S. 117927 and H.R. 248028
were introduced, repeating the language of the 1956 bills. In a conference
between the SEC and industry representatives concerning these legislative
proposals, Mr. Mooney of the American Stock Exchange and Mr. Rosenberry
of the New York Stock Exchange voiced objection to "the possible unlimited
sequence of 10-day suspensions, and suggested that a 'cap' be put upon the
23. Hearings on H.R. 7852, supra note 19, at 22.
24. Hearings on H.R. 8720, supra note 4, at 900. When asked if he thought the bill
was constitutional, Commissioner Landis replied affirmatively. Id. at 901.
25. Letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission to Senator J. William Ful-
bright, Feb. 24, 1955, on file in the SEC Library.
26. S. 3915, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) ; H.R. 11129, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
27. 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
28. 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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total length of time during which the Commisision could suspend trading. ' 29
The Senate finally passed S. 377030 in 1960, which was a more extensive
version of S. 1179. It increased the suspension period to twenty days and
placed a nine month limitation on the successive suspension of listed securities.
A provision expanding the Commission's authority to the over-the-counter
market was added. This contained a twenty day suspension period with a
twelve month limit. The House, however, failed to pass these provisions, and
Section 19(a) (4) remained as it had been enacted.
Although the Commission has issued successive 19(a) (4) orders during
the pendency of 19(a) (2) proceedings, it does not view 19(a) (4) and suc-
cessive orders issued pursuant to that section as requiring initiation of 19(a) (2)
proceedings. Testifying in 1959, SEC Chairman Gadsby told a congressional
committee:
The duration of the suspension must depend upon the duration of
the emergency; a matter not subject to our control .... The sugges-
tion that the Commission should, after a certain period of time, com-
mence a proceeding under section 19(a) (2) of the statute, ignores
the fact that the emergency which requires suspension under section
19(a) (4) . . . very often ... furnishes no basis for a section 19 (a) (2)
proceeding. The latter proceeding can only be undertaken where the
issuer has failed to comply with the statute or rules thereunder.3 1
29. Memorandum from Thomas G. Meeker, General Counsel of the SEC to the Com-
mission, concerning the Legislative Program, April 16, 1959, on file in the SEC Library.
A similar argument concerning limitation of suspension powers was put forth in the
same year by Edward Gray, Executive Vice-President of the New York Stock Exchange:
In the proposed amendment of section 19(a) (4) [to specifically provide for
multiple suspensions], the Commission now asks for legislative authority to do
what it has been doing for 15 years. . . We believe, however, that Congress
may want to take the opportunity to impose an overall time limit within which
the Commission must proceed to a hearing as provided in section 19(a) (2).
Hearings on S. 1178, S. 1179, S. 1180, S. 1181, and S. 1182 Before the Securities Sub-
comm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., at 40-1
(1959).
30. 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
31. Hearings on H.R. 2480, H.R. 2481, H.R. 2482, H.R. 5001 & H.R. 5002 Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., at 362 (1959).
Mr. Gadsby did, however, admit:
Lately, this grant of power [19(a) (4)] has been used to keep in effect a
suspension of trading pending final disposition of delisting proceedings under
Section 19(a) (2) of the Act. It has been useful where it has appeared that
the current information available to the public concerning a security is mis-
leading or is inadequate to permit investors to make informed judgments with
respect to its purchase or sale, and it appears that the additional necessary
information cannot be obtained and made available to investors until all. the
facts are elicited through the 19 (a) (2) proceedings. These proceedings, be-
cause of their complexity, often cannot be completed within a single 10-day
period, and it has been found necessary to renew the suspension for successive
1968]
Catholic University Law Review
Mr. Gadsby's statement notwithstanding, the subsequent analysis of suspen-
sion cases clearly shows that statutory violations are frequently present, but
Section 19(a) (2) proceedings have only infrequently been commenced by the
SEC.
In 1963 the Commission's interpretation received support from the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency. In a report accompanying a bill amend-
ing the 1934 Act, it stated:
The Commission has consistently construed Section 19(a) (4) as
permitting it to issue more than one suspension if, upon reexamina-
tion at the end of the 10-day period, it determines that another sus-
pension is necessary. The committee accepts this interpretation. At
the same time the committee recognizes that suspension of trading
in a security is a drastic step and that prolonged suspension of trading
may impose considerable hardship on stockholders. The committee
therefore expects that the Commission will exercise this power with
restraint and will proceed with all diligence to develop the necessary
facts in order that any suspension can be terminated as soon as pos-
sible. 32 (Emphasis added.)
10-day periods. No express authority for such action is contained in Section
19(a) (4), and its proposed amendment codifies the current interpretation
under which the Commission has acted.
Address by Edward N. Gadsby, Chairman of the SEC, American Society of Corporate
Secretaries, April 16, 1959.
Mr. Meeker expressed a similar feeling:
Sometimes the necessary information cannot be obtained and made avail-
able in the ten day period, and the Commission has had to renew the suspension
for one or more additional periods not exceeding ten days. Section 19(a) (4)
does not expressly provide such authority. The Commission's proposed amend-
ment to this section would codify its interpretation that it has the power to
renew temporary suspensions for one or more additional periods not exceeding
ten days.
During pendency of proceedings under Section 19(a) (2) to determine
whether to deny, suspend, or withdraw the registration of a security on a na-
tional exchange, the Commission has exercised its summary power to suspend
trading under Section 19(a) (4). Since this power to suspend is limited to
periods of ten days, the Commission has had to follow the practice of issuing
a series of consecutive orders under Section 19(a) (4) ; but this practice has
required a new determination every ten days of the necessity of continuing the
suspension under the standards of that section. Such periodic review and
series of orders should be unnecessary. . . under Section 19 (a) (2). Consequently,
the Commission has proposed an amendment to Section 19(a) (2) which would
eliminate the necessity of resorting to a series of successive ten days suspen-
sions under Section 19(a) (4) by empowering the Commission temporarily to
suspend trading in a security pending determination of a proceeding under Sec-
tion 19(a) (2).
Address by Thomas G. Meeker, General Counsel of the SEC, at the Briefing Conference on
Securities Laws and Regulations, Sponsored by the Federal Bar Association, in Chicago,
Ill., Feb. 19 and 20, 1959.
32. S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-7 (1963).
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Thus, what could not be done by direct legislation, was accomplished in-
directly. Such committee approval is one possible source of support for the
SEC's current interpretation.
Still another available source of justification for such an interpretation of
Section 19(a) (4) is the 1964 amendment which added Section 15(c) (5).
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency report accompanying the
amending bill stated:
The bill . . . would provide the Commission with authority sum-
marily to suspend over-the-counter trading in any security . . . for
periods of 10 days .... This provision would be a counterpart to sec-
tion 19(a) (4) .... As under section 19(a) (4), the Commission could
invoke this suspension power in those cases in which fraudulent or
manipulative practices of the issuer or other persons have deprived
the security of a fair and orderly market, or where some corporate
event makes informed trading impossible and provides opportunities
for the deception of investors. Trading would be resumed as soon as
adequate disclosure and dissemination of the facts material to in-
formed investment decision were achieved. 33 (Emphasis added.)
Section 15 (c) (5) is relied upon in two respects to bolster this broad interpre-
tation of Section 19(a) (4). First, the Senate 34 and House 35 reports on Sec-
tion 15(c) (5) specifically refer to "periods" of suspension. Second, there is no
equivalent in Section 15 to Section 19(a) (2). It is thus argued that 19(a) (4)
cannot consistently be viewed as a mere prelude to proceedings pursuant to
19(a) (2). Of course, both of these arguments ignore the fact that the two
sections were enacted by different Congresses. Further, the mere absence of
a counterpart provision in Section 15 cannot singularly emasculate Section
19(a) (2) and any relationship that subsection 4 is asserted to have with it.
Nor does the adoption of 15(c) (5) alter the fact that the House of Represen-
tatives has not responded to repeated requests to grant express statutory au-
thority for successive suspensions under 19 (a) (4).
In returning to the basis for this analysis, and evaluating objections to the
Commission's interpretation, legislative history says much for the view that the
enacting Congress in 1934 never conceived of successive suspensions. On the
other hand, the intent of at least the reporting committees at the time of the
adoption of Section 15(c) (5) was to allow successive suspensions. Consis-
tently, those committees sanctioned, for whatever value, the same interpre-
tation of Section 19(a) (4). No definitive resolution of the issue is readily
33. Id. at 66.
34. Id. at 26.
35. H.R. RFP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1964).
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reached. As a practical matter, the result would be perplexing indeed were
courts to adopt contrary interpretations for two sections with exactly the same
wording.
Case Analysis
The staff of the SEC carefully monitors exchange and over-the-counter
trading. If an irregularity appears, or even an unexplained or unusual inci-
dent, the staff will investigate. Often, however, not enough information can
be gathered to disseminate, or even if it can be, dissemination cannot be made
rapidly enough to influence investor action. At this point suspension is fre-
quently commenced by either or both the Division of Trading and Markets
and the Division of Corporate Finance, particularly the latter in cases of
failure to file required reports. Even if the SEC is not in a position at that
time to prove a case of illegality or irregularity, it may nevertheless take the
case to the Commission with a request for suspension. Upon a finding that an
"emergency" exists, a suspension will issue. The entire process-from informa-
tion of irregularity to issuance of a suspension order-may take as little as one
hour, but in most cases the process is more extended.
Because of the myriad factors which influence the issuance of a suspension
order, and because of the significant increase in suspension orders after the
1964 amendment, it is convenient and helpful to divide a case analysis into
two periods, with 1964 as the demarcation line. As previously mentioned, this
date is important for several reasons. First, the SEC interpreted the Eighty-
sixth Congress' amendment as an acknowledgment of its power to issue a
series of orders in the event an "emergency" continues for more than ten days.
Secondly, although the Commission had direct power to suspend exchange
trading prior to 1964, it had no equivalent authority over unlisted securities
traded over-the-counter, and only indirect authorization to suspend listed
securities traded in this manner through Rule 15c2-2. 36 In 1964 the Com-
36. Section 15(c) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 prohibits the use of the
mails or interstate commerce in fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices or
fictitious quotations in respect to securities traded over-the-counter. The section con-
tinues:
The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph, by rules and regula-
tions define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraululent, deceptive, or manipulative and such quota-
tions as are fictitous.
52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (2) (1964).
Pursuant to this section, Rule 15c2-2 was promulgated, enabling the Commission to
suspend over-the-counter trading when necessary to prevent such practices. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15c2-2 (1949). Rule 15c2-2 was repealed September 1, 1964, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No.
34-7408, shortly after Section 15 (c) (5) was enacted. 29 Fed. Reg. 12627 (1964).
One of the intricate problems presented to the broker-dealer as a result of the increased
number of suspensions relates to the post-suspension consummation of securities transac-
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mission was given express statutory power to summarily suspend trading on
the over-the-counter market.
In the following analysis, the bases upon which the Commission orders a
suspension will be developed. These criteria, however, have been gleaned
from the SEC's news releases, issued in conjunction with a suspension. That
factors other than those released by the SEC enter into the Commission's
decision warrant acknowledgment; in fact, most of the releases are of a
boilerplate nature and provide only a sketchy background. Since the analysis
is dependent entirely upon what the SEC releases, no suspension can be
singled out as ill-timed or unjustly issued, and this study cannot be conclu-
sive as to fairness of application.
Pre-Amendment rears
During the pre-amendment period, the Commission suspended trading on
twenty-nine occasions. In eleven instances37 the exchanges themselves sus-
pended trading prior to the Commission's order, and in nine of these cases
they continued the suspension after it was terminated by the Commission.
38
The effect of the Commission's action in these instances was to make the
suspension applicable to over-the-counter trading of listed securities. There-
fore, when the Commission lifted its suspension only over-the-counter trading
was permitted. In all cases during this period, with the exception of Trans
Continental Industries, Incorporated,39 the suspension affected both over-the-
counter and exchange trading of listed securities, and in no case did the
Commission suspend a security exclusively traded on the over-the-counter
tions entered into by brokers or dealers before the Commission suspended trading in the
security. In a policy statement issued by the Division of Trading and Markets, the SEC
has taken the position that if a broker-dealer is not connected with the activity an-
nounced as a basis for the suspension, then "no objection need be raised under [Sections
19(a) (4) and 15(c) (5)] because the broker-dealer completes his contractual obliga-
tions in the particular transaction (e.g., by payment or delivery) while the suspension is
still in effect." Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 7920 (1966).
37. Tastee Freez Indus., Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7143, 7484 (1963) (15 months)
E.L. Bruce Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 6827, 6934 (1962) (5 months); Automated Pro-
cedures Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 6761, 6895 (1962) (6 months); United Indus.
Corp., Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. Nos. 6455, 6636 (1961) (8 months); Consolidated Dev. Corp.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 6182, 6404, 6406, 6672 (1960) (9 months); F. L. Jacobs Co.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 5881, 6144 (1959) (10 months); Cornucopia Gold Mines, Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 5743, 5818, 6339 (1958) (3Y months); Adolf Gobel, Inc., Sec. Ex.
Act Rel. Nos. 4814, 4896, 5003 (1953) (11 months); Seaboard Commercial Corp., Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 4160, 4170 (1948) (23 days); Kresge Dept. Stores, Inc., Sec. Ex.
Act. Rel. Nos. 3840, 3852 (1946) (30 days); Interstate Home Equip. Co., Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. Nos. 3753, 3766, 3794 (1945) (37 days).
38. The only two cases in which the exchange lifted their bans simultaneously with
the SEC were: Adolf Gobel, Inc., supra note 37; United Indus. Corp., supra note 37.
39. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 5724, 5736 (1958) (20 days).
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market. Presumably, since Rule 15c2-2 was a derivative power, the Commis-
sion felt it had no authority to suspend such a security.
Looking to the cases themselves, the Commission in three instances
40 sus-
pended trading because the price of the stock had markedly increased to a
point far above its actual value. In these cases the exchanges had suspended
trading prior to the Commission's order, a suspension which remained in
effect after the Commission's order was terminated.
Failure to file reports with the SEC was the criterion for suspension of two
other companies' securities. In one,41 a proxy statement soliciting shareholder
approval of a contemplated merger was not filed. Moreover, the statement
omitted certain information required by the proxy rules. In the other case,
42
the Commission suspended trading because the company failed to file its
10-K annual report. The San Francisco Mining Exchange ultimately de-
listed the security for this reason.
Action was commenced in eight cases43 because serious questions were
raised as to the accuracy and/or adequacy of financial and other information
previously filed with the SEC. A typical example is United Industrial Cor-
poration.44 The initial suspension was precipitated by the company's an-
nouncement of changes in its management and of writedowns and adjust-
ments aggregating some $7 million in its inventories, accounts receivable,
and other assets. In addition to raising questions as to the accuracy of its
financial statements, the Commission also felt there was inadequate informa-
tion for public investors to rely upon in evaluating the company's securities.
The New York Stock Exchange and the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange had
previously suspended trading, and their suspensions entered into the Commis-
sion's determination. The Commission ultimately terminated its order, after
40. In both Interstate Home Equip. Co., supra note 37, and Kresge Dept. Stores,
Inc., supra note 37, the companies were in the process of liquidation and the value of
their securities in liquidation was substantially less than the trading prices. In Sea-
board Commercial Corp., supra note 37, the president of Seaboard sent letters both to the
Exchange and the Commission stating that there was a question whether the stock was
worth anything.
41. Apex Minerals Corp., Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. Nos. 6556, 6894 (1961) (16 months).
After statements had been filed with the SEC and mailed to all shareholders of the com-
pany, the suspension was lifted.
42. Industrial Enterprises, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 6747, 6926, 7579 (1962)
(8 months).
43. Tastee Freez Indus., Inc., supra note 37; Atlantic Research Corp., Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. Nos. 6911, 6937 (1962) (36 days); E. L. Bruce Co., supra note 37; Automated Pro-
cedures Corp., supra note 37; Telectro Indus. Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 6500, 6566
(1961) (67 days); United Indus. Corp., supra note 37; Flour Mills of America, Inc.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 4913, 4936 (1953) (35 days) ; Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America,
supra note 3.
44. Supra note 37.
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successively issuing 25 ten-day suspensions, when adequate dissemination of
clarifying information was made.
In another instance,45 the reason for suspension was that several broker-
dealers were engaged in an unregistered distribution of securities in violation
of Sections 546 and 1747 of the Securities Act. Concurrently, there had been
substantial purchases of the company's securities by a foreign source at rising
prices on the American Stock Exchange. The suspension was not continued
beyond a second ten-day period, since the Commission in the meantime had
filed an injunction against the broker-dealers, and the issuer and other con-
trolling persons had agreed not to sell any shares until the Commission's
investigation was completed.
In Continental Vending Machine Corporation,4 8 the failure to file a 10-K
report and lack of knowledge concerning the collectibility of certain loans or
advances to an affiliate were the criteria which prompted a suspension order.
Here, the Commission had gone through the ritual of ten-day suspensions for
more than five years, and is presently still suspending trading. In R. C.
Williams & Company,49 the Commission issued a suspension for seven days
to allow adequate dissemination of information released by the company.
In eleven cases50 the suspension of trading was concurrent with the insti-
tution of proceedings under Section 19 (a) (2), and in the remaining two
cases,51 concurrent with stop-order proceedings under the 1933 Act.5 2 Al-
though the Commission has demonstrated, even from its first suspension order,
that it could issue more than a single suspension so long as it made a redeter-
mination every ten days, a serious statutory problem arises by the Commis-
45. Trans Continental Indus., Inc., supra note 39.
46. 48 Stat. 77-8 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
47. 48 Stat. 84-5 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1964).
48. Supra note 6. On April 8, 1963, a conservator, appointed by the federal district
court, was directed to prepare and file with the American Stock Exchange and the
SEC all reports required by Sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 Act. Continental is pres-
ently still in the hands of receivers.
49. Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7258, 7263 (1964) (7 days).
50. Prosper Oil & Mining Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 6899, 6976 (1962) (3 months);
Precision Microwave Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 6772, 6973, 7319, 7377 (1962)
(9 months) (also involved a stop-order) ; Black Bear Indus., Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos.
6539, 6975 (1961) (20 months); Bon Ami Co., supra note 5; F.L. Jacobs Co., supra note
37; Cornucopia Gold Mines, supra note 37; Bellanca Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel.Nos.
5500, 5501, 5706 (1957) (13'/ months) ; Kroy Oils, Ltd., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 5389,
5393, 5399, 5483 (1956) (52 months); Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd., Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
Nos. 5379, 5382, 5385, 5386 (1956) (5/ months) ; Adolf Gobel, Inc., supra note 37; Red
Bank Oil Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 3742, 3770, 3902 (1945) (2Y2 months) (also in-
volved a stop-order proceeding).
51. Consolidated Dev. Corp., supra note 37; Skiatron Electronics & Television Corp.,
Sec. Ex. Act. Rel. Nos. 6146, 6372, 6380 (1960) (10 months).
52. 48 Stat. 79-80 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1964).
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sion's use of Section 19(a) (4) as a pendente lite suspension power in a
Section 19(a) (2) proceeding. 53 Under 19(a) (2) the issuer has an absolute
right to appropriate notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to any
suspension; in no event can a suspension exceed twelve months. In marked
contrast, Section 19(a) (4) allows the Commission to summarily suspend any
security if an emergency is present. The issuer is not entitled to an adversary
proceeding, and the Commission, by tacking one suspension onto another, is
able to continue a suspension indefinitely. In some cases54 the Commission
summarily suspended securities for more than a year before any adjudication
was made in the 19(a) (2) proceeding-a proceeding which limits suspen-
sions issued under it to twelve months. Since 1962, the Commission has
avoided this quagmire by not exercising the summary suspension power in
conjunction with a 19(a) (2) proceeding.
Post-Amendment Years
After 1964, the Commission used Section 19(a) (4) more frequently, and the
total number of trading suspensions soared to 108. Securities traded exclu-
sively on the over-the-counter market were regulated by Section 15(c) (5)
-the counterpart to Section 19(a) (4)-and these comprised 52 of the sus-
pensions issued during this period. The companies themselves, for diverse
reasons, requested the Commission on occasion to suspend trading in their
own securities. The touchstones used during this period resembled those in
the pre-1964 era. Additional "emergencies" were added and others expanded.
In twelve cases,55 the Commission initially ordered the suspension of trad-
ing in the security due to an absence of current information available to the
public concerning the companies' financial condition. This resulted from their
failure to file certain reports with the SEC. The missing reports ranged from
the 10-K annual report and the 9-K semi-annual report to the 8-K and an-
53. II L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 854-55 (2d ed. 1961). See also Gadsby,
Current S.E.C. Legislative and Related Problems, 189 CoM. & FIN. CHRON. 1863, 1903
(1959).
54. Black Bear Indus., Inc., supra note 50 (20 months); Bon Ami Co., supra note
5 (28 months); Bellanca Corp., supra note 50 (13Y2 months).
55. Alsco, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8371, 8377 (1968) (10 days); B.S.F. Co., Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. No. 8358 (July 19, 1968) (still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968) ; Paramount Gen.
Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. 8329 (June 7, 1968) (still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968) ; American
Checkmaster Sys., Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8302, 8368 (1968) (3Y months); Pen-
rose Indus. Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8137, 8214 (1967) (5 months); Tel-A-Sign,
Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8132, 8158 (1967) (2 months); Steel Crest Homes, Inc.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8077, 8170 (1967) (5 months); American Steel & Pump Corp.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8058, 8091 (1967) (43 days); Sports Arenas, Inc., Sec. Ex.
Act Rel. Nos. 8005, 8102 (1966) (6 months); Lincoln Printing Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
Nos. 7925, 8116 (1966) (11Y2 months); Belock Instrument Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
Nos. 7632, 7741 (1965) (4Y months); Webb & Knapp, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos.
7594, 7602 (1965) (10 days).
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nual report to shareholders. Even though this primary factor was present,
the Commission indicated that other criteria entered tangentially into their
decision to suspend: e.g., suspension by the exchanges or speculation that the
company was experiencing financial difficulties.5 6 The Commission usually
timed the lifting of its order with the filing of the various reports and their
dissemination to the shareholders. In one instance,5 7 the SEC had to bring
an injunctive action against the company to compel filings for which it was
delinquent. Only after compliance with the injunction did the Commission
terminate its suspension order.
In twenty-three situations,58 the Commission's action was taken pending
clarification of reports appearing in newspapers or of rumors circulating in the
financial community with respect to recent company developments. For ex-
ample, in Nucleonic Corporation of America 59 the Commission's action was
precipitated by questions which arose as to releases the company disseminated
concerning a purportedly new nuclear detection device for medical diagnosis.
After the company issued a clarifying statement relating the facts of the in-
vention to its shareholders, the Commission terminated its order.
Various securities law violations were the reasons for suspension of trading
in eight instances. 60 Usually the suspensions were made in conjunction with
56. Compare Webb & Knapp, Inc., supra note 55 and Tel-A-Sign, Inc., supra note
55, with Belock Instrument Corp., supra note 55.
57. Penrose Indus. Corp., supra note 55.
58. Royston Coalition Mines, Ltd., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8330 (June 10, 1968)
(still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968); National Sweepstakes Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
Nos. 8309, 8369 (1968) (3 months) ; Golden Age Mines, Ltd., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8307
(May 6, 1968) (still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968) ; Alsco, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No.
8291 (1968) (4 days); Alscope Consol., Ltd., and Zimoco Petroleum Corp., Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. No. 8259 (Feb. 19, 1968) (still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968); Cameo-Parkway
Records, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8263 (Feb. 23, 1968) (still suspended on Aug. 20
1968); Santa Fe International, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8230, 8284 (1968) (2y2
months) ; Silver Shield Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8196, 8219 (1967) (31 days) ; Gold-
field Corp. and Chemelloy Minerals Ltd., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8108, 8112 (1967)
(11 days); Nucleonic Corp. of America, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8095, 8107 (1967)
(25 days); Interamerican Indus., Ltd., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8080, 8237 (1967)
(9 months) ; Nylo-Thane Plastics Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8065, 8089 (1967)
(30 days); Rand Dev. Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8026, 8081 (1967) (4 months);
First Standard Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7958, 7980 (1966) (35 days); Underwater
Storage Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7956, 8139 (1966) (11 months); Westec Corp., Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. No. 7945 (1966) (10 days); Great American Indus., Inc., Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. Nos. 7850, 7863, 7881, 7978 (1966) (6 months); Associated Oil & Gas Co., Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7798, 7819 (1966) (22 days); Noramco, Inc. and Bristol Dynamics,
Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7777, 7801 (1965) (38 days); Fotochrome, Inc., Sec.
Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7777, 7801 (1965) (1 month).
59. Supra note 58. Nucleonic's common stock was traded on the over-the-counter
market and on June 3, 1967, the day before the suspension was initiated, the stock was
traded at 11. The day after suspension was terminated, June 25, 1967, the stock was
traded at 1.
60. Coditron Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8144, 8295 (1967) (8 months) ; J. J. New-
berry Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8084, 8085 (1967) (2 days) ; Jade Oil & Gas Co., Sec.
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the filing of a complaint by the SEC seeking to enjoin the companies from
further violations of the acts.61 In Coditron Corporation,62 the company
itself requested the SEC to suspend trading in its common stock because in-
formation had been brought to its attention indicating possible irregularities
in its recent offering which was made pursuant to a claimed intrastate ex-
emption from the Securities Act's registration requirements.
The Commission on its own initiative or on request by the company has
suspended trading to permit dissemination of company releases and reports63
or SEC announcements concerning the institution of administrative proceed-
ings.64 With few exceptions, the suspensions in these circumstances have
never lasted more than one month; as soon as there was proper dissemina-
tion, the trading ban was lifted.
Since 1964, the absence of information concerning a company's financial
status or the presence of substantial questions relating to the accuracy and/or
adequacy of information received have often supplied the bases for a suspen-
sion order.65 Recently, a sharp rise in the price of an over-the-counter security,
Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8100, 8138 (1967) (53 days); S & P National Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
Nos. 8077, 8153 (1967) (4 months); Elkton Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7866, 7913
(1966) (3 months); Pinal County Dev. Ass'n, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7735, 8094 (1965)
(19 months); VTR, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7692, 7894 (1966) (9 months); Ida-
mont Oil & Mining Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7633, 7656 (1965) (34 days).
61. For example, in J. J. Newberry Co., supra note 60, the Commission suspended
trading because it questioned the validity of a tender offer which was made for ap-
proximately one-half of the company's common stock. The next day the Commission
announced that the temporary suspension of trading would be terminated; in the in-
terim, the SEC had filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the tender offer. On the day
before the suspension the common stock was traded at 23Y8. The day after the suspen-
sion was terminated, it had dropped to 20Y2.
62. Supra note 60.
63. Kennebec Consol. Mining Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8346, 8365 (1968) (38
days) ; Planet Oil & Mineral Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8339, 8353 (1968) (27 days);
Nagler Helicopter, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8338 (1968) (10days) ; White Electro-
magnetics, Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8304, 8305 (1968) (11 days) ; Hamilton Life Ins. Co.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8250 (1968) (10 days); Mesur-matic Electronics Corp., Sec. Ex.
Act Rel. No. 8246 (1968) (10 days); Inglewood Gasoline Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos.
8245, 8254 (1968) (20 days); Berlin Doman Helicopters, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No.
8243 (1968) (5 days); Brilund Mines, Ltd., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8241 (1968) (5
days); Medical Electroscience, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8236 (1968)(8 days);
Nylo-Thane Plastics Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8203 (1967)(5 days); Subscription
Television, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8088, 8182 (1967) (5 months); American Plan
Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8091, 8097 (1967) (12 days); Electro-Nucleonics, Inc.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8048, 8056 (1967) (35 days); Vitro Corp. of America, Sec. Ex.
Act Rel. No. 7822 (1966) (1 day) ; Empire Petroleum Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 7565
(1965) (5 days).
64. Crescent Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8016, 8200 (1967) (3 days).
65. Master-Craft Electronics Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8385 (Aug. 14, 1968)
(still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968); Rover Shoe Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8211
(Dec. 13, 1967) (still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968); Leeds Shoes, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. No. 8205 (Dec. 12, 1967) (still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968); Roto American
Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8143, 8292 (1967) (8 months); Northern Instrument Corp.,
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coupled with a lack of current financial information, has been the SEC's most
frequently used criterion to suspend trading.66 In all such cases, the securities
have been exclusively traded on the over-the-counter market, thus possibly
explaining scarcity of information about the company.
Remedies
Thus far the legislative history behind the relevant sections and the criteria
upon which the SEC finds an "emergency" have been shown. There have been
no cases testing either the interpretation given the sections by the SEC, or, as-
suming the SEC's interpretation is correct, the constitutionality of the sec-
tions. This is because, as the analysis of the cases tends to indicate, the SEC
presumably has not used a suspension order in an inappropriate situation.
Suppose, however, the SEC suspends a security upon a mistaken belief of
fact, or the aggrieved company contends that the SEC is without a statutory
basis upon which to suspend trading in its stock. There are only two possible
courses of action the company could take. It might appeal the decision di-
rectly to the courts or bring a collateral action to obtain judicial review of the
summary action.
Judicial Review
The Exchange Act, unlike the other five statutes administered by the SEC,
limits judicial review to aggrieved persons who are parties to an administra-
tive proceeding.67 In a summary suspension case, judicial review would be
improper since this is not considered a "proceeding" within the meaning of
the Administrative Procedure Act.68 The legislative history of the Exchange
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8061, 8142 (1967) (3 2 months); Pakco Co., Sec. Ex. Act Re!. Nos.
8010, 8031, 8200, 8215 (1966) (1 year) ; A. C. Gilbert Co. and Wrather Corp., Sec. Ex.
Act Rel. Nos. 7861, 7881 (1966) (22 days); United Security Life Ins. Co., Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. Nos. 7812, 8055 (1967) (14 months); Marrud, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 7778,
7796 (1965) (20 days).
66. Comstock-Keystone Mining Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8359 (July 22, 1968)
(still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968) ; Alcar Instruments, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No.
8287 (March 28, 1968) (still suspended on Aug. 20, 1968); Meter Maid Indus., Inc.,
Sec. Ex. Act Rel. No. 8297 (1968) (7 days); Cormac Chemical Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel.
Nos. 8252, 8286, 8290, 8342 (1968) (4Y2 months); Uranium King Corp., Sec. Ex. Act
Rel. Nos. 8235, 8285 (1968) (2V months); Kashmir Oil, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos.
8227, 8275 (1968) (2/s months); Wyoming Nuclear Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8225,
8271 (1968) (2 months); Fastline, Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8190, 8355 (1967)
(8Y2 months); Power Oil Co., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8167, 8184 (1967) (38 days);
Jodmar Indus., Inc., Sec. Ex. Act Re!. Nos. 8156, 8192 (1967) (66 days); Dyna
Ray Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8147, 8178 (1967) (2 months); North American Re-
search & Dev. Corp., Sec. Ex. Act Rel. Nos. 8130, 8276 (1967) (82 months).
67. 48 Stat. 901 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1964).
68. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (12) (Supp. 11 1965-66). With regard to exclusion of judicial re-
view by statute, the Administrative Procedure Act provides:
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Act demonstrates a high degree of concern that orders of the Commission be
appealable; to that end, there was discussion in committee, as well as a floor
debate, regarding insertion of the word "order" at various points in the act to
insure court review. 69 Some legislators seemed to be under the misimpression
that use of the word "order" would in itself guarantee judicial intervention.
70
However, such is not the case; there must be not merely an order, but an order
pursuant to a proceeding. In any event, neither of the sections under con-
sideration contain the magic word "order." With Congress so conscious of this
word's importance, there is little room for doubt that summary suspensions
were not intended to be statutorily appealable to the courts.
Extraordinary Remedies
In the absence of statutory provisions for judicial review of suspension orders,
resort must be made to two of the so-called "extraordinary remedies"-in-
junction and prohibition. The statutory remedy of declaratory judgment may
also be employed. The primary and most expeditious method of bringing the
matter before the courts is by use of an injunction. 71 In the lead case of
American School of Magnetic Healing Company v. McAnnulty7 2 the use of
the equitable injunction as a means for review of administrative action was
firmly established.
A preliminary injunction may be granted on advance notice to the defend-
ant 73 and, if granted, would bar the defendant from performing designated
acts during the pendency of the basic law suit. In the case of a summary sus-
pension, however, a great deal of damage is done when the suspension order
is initially issued. This damage could not be avoided by preliminary injunc-
tion, since the aggrieved company would not be in a position to afford the
few days necessary to bring the motion before the court for argument. Initially,
therefore, in this situation, an ex parte temporary restraining order would be
a desirable remedy for the company, since it may be issued without notice and
could bar the SEC from taking the threatened action until a hearing on the
(a) This chapter [Judicial Review] applies, according to the provisions there-
of, except to the extent that-
(1 ) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
5 U.S.C. § 701 (Supp. 11 1965-66). This provision was upheld in Sugarman v. Forbragd,
267 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
69. See 78 Cong. Rec. 8090-93, 8098-99 (1934).
70. Id. at 8092 (remarks of Congressman Wadsworth).
71. 3 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 23.04 (1958).
72. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a) (1).
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motion for a preliminary injunction. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)
provides:
A temporary restraining order may be granted without written or
oral notice to the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly
appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified com-
plaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the applicant before the adverse party . . . can be heard in
opposition .... (Emphasis added.)
A company seeking a temporary restraining order in a suspension case may
encounter difficulty in clearly showing an immediate threat of irreparable
injury. Congress has expressed its intent in Section 19(a) (4) that suspensions
shall be issued ex parte in the Commission's discretion to protect the public
investor. Thus it may be necessary for the company to overcome a presump-
tion that the Commission is acting in the public interest and perhaps protect-
ing the public from irreparable injury. This is far more difficult than simply
demonstrating that an initial or successive suspension will cause the price of
the company's stocks to fall.
Another method of review, the one most commonly combined with the in-
junction, is declaratory judgment. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court
of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading,
may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration . . . .Any such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable
as such.
74
A company seeking judicial relief from an initial or successive suspension may
be able to obtain a declaration of the legality of the SEC's action. A district
court, under its general federal question equity jurisdiction, 75 is empowered
to correct agency conduct in excess of its delegated powers and contrary to a
specific prohibition of the act establishing it.76 The test to be applied in de-
termining whether the Declaratory Judgment Act, which constitutes a nar-
row exception to the customary avenues of review, may be invoked is "wheth-
er the Commission has stepped plainly beyond the bounds of its statutory au-
thority, or has acted in clear defiance of [plaintiff's] constitutional rights to
[his] irreparable damage."
77
In applying this test, courts have been reluctant to find that an agency has
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
76. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189-90 (1958).
77. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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overreached its statutory authority, and this reluctance has resulted in very
strict constructions of the test. In M.G. Davis & Company v. Cohen,78 a
broker-dealer brought an action for declaratory relief against the SEC, seek-
ing a determination that proceedings brought against him by the Commission
were not timely under Rule 15b-6.79 In denying the relief sought, the court
stated: "This is not a case where there has been 'an attempted exercise of
power that had been specifically withheld.' "80 On appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reached the same result, but mollified somewhat the
district court's rule that the power had to be specifically withheld, stating:
The other claim [that the Commission had overstepped the limits of
its power], if established, would amount to no more than a reason-
ably possible interpretation of a somewhat ambiguous statute in a
manner which would most protect the class which the Commission was
established to protect. In neither case could the excess be considered
so extreme as to warrant a district court to upset the orderly course
of review procedures.
81
Both courts were hesitant to find that the SEC exceeded its authority. Sus-
pension cases, however, must be distinguished in one important aspect from
these and similar holdings.8 2 Ever present in such determinations is the
court's belief that the claimant should first exhaust his administrative reme-
dies before seeking a judicial declaration of the issue. In the case of a sum-
mary suspension, of course, there are no administrative remedies to exhaust,
and therefore a court may be more willing to grant declaratory relief by con-
struing the "in excess of statutory authority" test more liberally.
The most recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court in an action
brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act reveal a willingness to
depart from a rigid test and allow the equitable relief sought.83 Recognizing
the necessity for equitable relief where there is no adequate remedy at law, the
Court held in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner8 4 that the exercise of judicial
power to enjoin allegedly erroneous regulatory action by the Commissioner
of Food and Drugs is permissible, unless Congress has explicitly prohibited it,
and provided the controversy is "ripe" for judicial determination. The
Court stated that "[t]hese regulations purport to give an authoritative inter-
78. 256 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b6-1 (1967).
80. M. G. Davis & Co. v. Cohen, supra note 78, at 135.
81. M. G. Davis & Co. v. Cohen, 369 F.2d 360, 363 (2d Cir. 1966).
82. See, e.g., Barie v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964); Pharmaceutical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
83. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, Inc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967) ; Abbott Laboratories
v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see also Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
158 (1967).
84. Supra note 83.
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pretation of a statutory provision ... [and] its promulgation puts petitioners
in a dilemna that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act
to ameliorate."85 Justice Fortas dissented and noted that the Court's ruling
was "novel in its breadth and destructive in its implications .... "86 But
this dissent is based on a situation where Congress had provided a method
of judicial review for the agency's action and the government therefore should
not be prematurely brought to a halt.8 7 Suspension cases would seem to fit
squarely into the area the majority in Abbott sought to help since no adequate
remedy at law exists, and such cases can also be distinguished from situations
upon which Justice Fortas' dissent was based since no statutory review is pro-
vided.
88
Another possible remedy, the writ of prohibition, is available to prevent
action, judicial in nature, by an administrative body, when the power to deal
with the subject matter is beyond the statutory jurisdiction of the agency.
8 9
The writ runs against the tribunal and does not lie to prevent purely "ad-
ministrative" acts. Yet if the proceedings have been completed, prohibition
will not lie, since it issues only to prevent the commission of a future act and
not to correct past errors. Although the application of prohibition to sum-
mary suspension would appear to be appropriate because all the conditions
for use of the remedy are readily fulfilled, the amount of time required to
reach the courts destroys its effectiveness. Additionally, this remedy has been
only infrequently used by the courts; it is suggested that in seeking a review
of administrative action, prohibition accomplishes nothing that an injunction
and declaratory judgment do not better accomplish. 90
In attempting to restrain the issuance of a suspension order, the basic law suit
could be approached on either or both of the following theories. The SEC's
interpretation of congressional intent might be challenged as incorrect. If the
SEC's interpretation is .held to be -an accurate reflection of congressional in-
tent on number of suspensions, then the summary suspension provision itself
could be attacked as a violation of due process or as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of Congress's power over interstate commerce. In neither approach is
there even a degree of certainty of success. The prevailing view that the Com-
mission has power to issue successive suspensions is well entrenched by reason
85. Id. at 152.
86. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass'n, supra note 83, at 177 (dissenting opinion).
87. Ibid.
88. Comparison can be made between suspension cases which involve an informal
summary procedure and other informal agency actions for which there are no adminis-
trative remedies to exhaust prior to invoking extraordinary remedies. For a discussion
of recent Supreme Court decisions in the latter class, see Sultan, Supreme Court Re-
view of "Informal" or Threatened Agency Action, 18 AD. L. REv. 55, 59-60 (1965).
89. K. DAVIs, supra note 71, at § 23.14.
90. Ibid.
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of the power's continued and increased exercise itself. If, as suggested, it is
challenged on the basis of congressional intent, it is likely to be upheld.
Should the courts interpret the statute as the SEC does, the very idea of
limitless deprivation without any form of hearing, trial, or even a simple
meeting with authorities could carry the sections beyond the most permissive
limits of fifth amendment due process. Still another constitutional objection is
the very delegation under the commerce clause of so uncircumscribed a power.
As earlier noted, the keystone of constitutionality in delegating powers is the
promulgation of sufficient guidelines to govern application of the power.
Here, there are no guidelines. The mere requirement that continued suspen-
sion will necessitate the issuance of a new order every ten days, presumably
after some ex parte administrative review and a determination that the "emer-
gency" still exists, may afford some protection, as the Act is presumably ad-
ministered by men of good faith, but constitutional exigencies are not founded
in the bedrock of administrative good faith.
The process of constitutional invalidation seems more likely, though more
arduous and less satisfactory from the standpoint of protracted litigation. In
attempting a constitutional argument, the court might avoid the constitutional
question and find another basis for their decision. It is possible in that situation
that the court would then revert to the interpretation argument, treat the
committee reports as inconclusive of congressional intent, and construe the sec-
tions narrowly as allowing, by the very language of the statute, only one sus-
pension.
Conclusion
The SEC's greatly increased exercise of its summary suspension powers has
brought into question the possible limitations on those powers. Since nothing
has been litigated on this subject and all information concerning suspensions
must be gathered from the SEC's releases, no definitive resolution of the issue
can be reached at this point. Analysis of the legislative history of Sections
19(a) (4) and 15(c) (5) and the criteria for issuance of suspensions have been,
at most, informative on this issue. The following conclusions, however, can be
drawn.
First, there is not unanimity, nor has there ever been, on the interpretation
of these sections or on the extent of the Commission's summary suspension
powers. But the Commission's interpretation is well-entrenched in practice
and unlikely to be upset if challenged judicially. Secondly, there is a diligent
effort to invoke suspension with a conscientious fairness. This is not to say
that the Commission's successive use of the power is correct, but only that, as
the cases indicate, the applications to date have 'been, almost without ex-
ception, in the best interests of the public investor. Of course, there is always
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the possibility that the SEC might suspend a security upon a mistaken belief
of fact, and apart from this, even the most judicious application cannot save
an unconstitutional act, nor engraft undelegated authority on a delegated
power.
These conclusions reflect a need for a practical, if only partial, solution of
the serious difficulties arising from ex parte summary suspension and its suc-
cessive application. As has been shown, the SEC believes it may indefinitely
suspend trading in a security and bar any administrative hearing or relief to a
company or its shareholders. In practice, however, the Commission staff will,
if requested, in some instances represent the views of a company when seeking
a suspension, or a company may informally urge its position upon the Com-
mission after the initial ten-day suspension but before a renewal. Of course,
a representation of a company's position by the same staff which is simul-
taneously requesting suspension is faint praise indeed. And, although an after-
the-fact opportunity for the company to explain its position may prevent suc-
cessive suspensions, one suspension may have done irreparable damage.
Despite these obvious shortcomings, the informal proceedings which allow
a threatened or suspended company some representation before the Com-
mission go a long way toward eliminating possible inequities in the areas of
initial suspension and successive application. It is therefore recommended
that Congress make such proceedings mandatory. At the very least, this
would eliminate successive suspensions based on mistake of fact and assure
that all suspensions are issued only in the direct interest of the public, and
not as an enforcement-tool which provides an easy way for the SEC staff to
coerce companies into following its suggestions.
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